

Committees: Safer City Partnership Strategy Group	Date: November 2017
Subject: Safer Communities Project - Outcomes review	
Report of: Jonit Report of Commissioner and Town Clerk	For Information
Report Author: Rachel Vipond, Change Portfolio Office	

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

By virtue of paragraph 3 and 7 of Part I of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972.

Summary

1. This paper aims to be a factual representation of the work undertaken on the Safer Communities Project. It will set out the work streams that the project team created, the resulting outputs/outcomes and the current status and ownership of the work stream.
2. This paper will act as a reference point for future projects that may incorporate similar work streams.
3. An objective assessment of the overall project will be informed by the outcome of a lessons learned workshop that the Town Clerk's department have indicated will take place following the submission of this report.

Recommendation

4. Members are asked to note the content of the report.

Main Report

Background

5. The Safer Communities Project was a collaborative City of London and City of London Police Project. There were a number of changes at Project Executive level. The project came under the governance of the One Safe City programme. There was a number of changes in SRO of this Programme over its life.
6. The Project was formally closed by the Safer Communities Project Board in June 2017.
7. Following representation from Town Clerks, the Police Change Portfolio Office agreed to produce this report to allow the Safer City Partnership to have oversight of the outcomes.
8. The report comprises an overview of each work stream followed by a more detailed breakdown of the activity conducted.
9. An Opportunity Outline was produced in January 2016, extract below:

Expected Outcomes

The project will deliver:

Options and recommendations for a series of short term improvements

- *Full analysis and mapping of functional capabilities to provide an measurable view of function/service compatibility and ensure removal of duplication*
- *Analysis of service delivery models and recommendations for the best delivery of service in conjunction with the Joint Contact and Control Room and the Ring of Steel.*
- *Scoping and recommendation for delivery of proposals leading from analysis*
- *In-depth benefits baseline for realistic performance monitoring*
- *Delivery of service transformation within the bounds of both the One Safe City and Customer Service Programmes ensuring strategic cohesion.*

10. There is no evidence that the 'Expected outcomes' detailed in this document were fully achieved. A further 'one page' briefing note was also produced. See full Opportunity Outline and briefing note at Appendix I.
11. Following the production of the Opportunity Outline, the project created a total of 16 workstreams. These are summarised in the body of this report.
12. Data that outlines how much time was spent on each workstream is not available.

Next Steps

13. It is recommended that a Lessons Learned exercise is conducted with the output owned and learning disseminated by appropriate colleagues in Town Clerks.

Community Safety – work streams

Work stream 1

Community Safety Team – Process Map.

Status: Work was undertaken and provides a platform for future work.

Handover to; Community Safety team, Town Clerks – City of London Corporation.

- A copy of documents will be saved to Corporation/OSC version of SharePoint.

Purpose of work stream

To identify touch points/interactions with City of London's Community Safety team, internal departments and external parties.

Outputs/outcomes/outcomes

- Work was undertaking but due to its complexity it wasn't possible for the safer communities team to get a clear picture.
- Part of the work included a 'heat map'. This document shows the City of London's capabilities across its departments and corresponding touch points.

Work stream 2

Information Sharing

Status: Activity halted at closure of project

Also see: Appendix A – Briefing note OSC003/SC001, Information Management Escalation – Corporate Responsibility for administration of information sharing

Appendix J – Information Sharing Recommendations spreadsheet

Ownership

Ownership of the outcomes to be agreed. Suggested ownership Town Clerks Department and Comptroller & City Solicitor – City of London Corporation

Purpose of work stream

To understand the information flow around a set of scenarios, identify perceived blockers and what needs to be put in place to enable information to be shared as appropriate.

Work undertaken

- Workshops conducted and included attendees the City of London Police and the City of London Corporation, as well as their external partners.
- The result of the workshops was captured in a spreadsheet. with suggestions of opportunities and recommendations.
- Creation of a draft overarching information sharing agreement

Outputs/outcome

- As per the Matrix for Vulnerable People: Some recommendations were identified
- As per the Matrix: for Domestic Violence some recommendations were identified.
- Outcomes were to inform Information Management – Register of Information Sharing Agreements.

Work stream 3

Information Management – Register of Information Sharing Agreements.

Status: Activity halted at closure of project

See also: Appendix A – Briefing note OSC003/SC001, Information Management Escalation – Corporate Responsibility for administration of information sharing
Appendix B - Briefing Note OSC012/SC004 update - Information Management Escalation – Single Version of the Truth

Appendix C – Information Sharing Registers spreadsheet

Ownership: To be agreed by Town Clerks and City Solicitor for next steps.

Purpose of work stream

To create a register of Information Sharing Agreements and memorandum of Understanding between departments and directorates across the City of London Police and the City of London Corporation. To create an easy accessible database (most likely an intranet page) containing guidance to Officers and staff.

Outputs/outcomes

- Information gathering exercise on Departments which may have ISAs contacted requesting details.
- Briefing note escalated around lack of business as usual resource to work on information sharing.
- Information Sharing Matrix to inform any future activity around Information Sharing and MOU.
- Report to OSC project executive on findings.

Work stream 4

Personal Safety Visiting Tool (PSVT) [Formally known as Property Risk Tool]

Status: Project input complete. Will be rolled out by Health, Safety and Wellbeing Manager.

Ownership: Justin Tyas, Health, Safety and Wellbeing Manager, Health & Safety – City of London Corporation

Purpose of work stream

To deal with the risk of Corporation staff visiting premises that other services had identified risks with, but had not shared the information. This work was originally investigated in 2010, but not taken forward.

Outputs/outcomes

- Tool created, utilising technology within system estate – meaning no cost.
- Property information loaded into system.
- Access is given only to those Officers who need to know and with good reason. Access is not widely available.
- Staff from the City of London Corporation are made aware of any issues or problems associated to a premises/property in the City. Advise on what measures to take prior to visiting.
- The City of London are meeting their obligation and responsibility regarding 'duty of care' an employer to protect the Health and Safety as well as welfare of their staff.

Work stream 5

Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS).

Status: Dependant on an external organisation applying for accreditation – **therefore will go-live on first application.**

See also: Appendix C, Briefing Note OSC015/SC007, Community Safety Accreditation Scheme, Neighbourhood/Community Wardens

Ownership: To be agreed. Suggested ownership Information & Intelligence Directorate, City of London Police.

Purpose of work stream

To accredit staff of certain organisations related to Community Safety with powers, to reduce demand on Police Officers.

Outputs/outcomes

- CSAS Application pack created.

[Potentially, if agreed and ratified, the granting of powers for community safety matters, to recognised partners and the local authority (CoLC).]

Work stream 6

Everbridge Replacement – Police Messaging.

Status: Activity halted. Became the Everbridge Improvement work stream

See also: Appendix D, Briefing Note OSC019/SC011, Update on Messaging Tool Progress

Appendix E, Briefing Note OSC021/SC013, Messaging Tool – procurement of ECD Neighbourhood Alerts System following on from Everbridge contractual position

Ownership: Procurement – City of London Corporation Procurement

Purpose of work stream

The Everbridge contract was thought to end in December 2016. A cancellation letter needed to be sent 30 days prior to that and a replacement solution identified.

Outputs/outcomes

- Critical and non-critical channels were identified through workshops.
- Requirements of the City of London Police and the Corporation were captured. Including taking advantage of emerging technology and communication methods.
- Supplier selection activity started.
- The Everbridge contract was thought to end in December 2016. A cancellation letter needed to be sent 30 days prior to that and a replacement solution identified.
- Informed by the supplier that replacement couldn't progress as City of London and City of London Police had been signed into a contract until February 2019 – this was unknown to the project, City Procurement and the business.
- Lessons learnt exercise was conducted by the City of London Corporation Procurement team, in the management of contracts with suppliers.

Work stream 7

Everbridge Improvement

Status: Complete

See Also: Appendix F Briefing Note OSC027/SC019, Re-Implementation of Critical Messaging Tool

Ownership: Appropriate owners from the Corporation and the City Police are still to be identified, however the project recommended that account management should be via the City of London Police's Corporate Media team and system admin by IT – City of London Corporation.

Purpose of work stream

Once the replacement had stopped, work was undertaken to improve the use of Everbridge for the last 2 years of the contract.

Outputs/outcomes

- Enhanced messaging to all subscribers of Everbridge for Residents, Small Medium Enterprises, and Corporate Partners.
- Guidance on message quality and quantity.
- User survey to subscriber base asking for feedback on messaging.
- Feedback given to Police Corporate Media Department
- 33 % increase in Resident and SME subscriptions.
- Reduction in Test messaging from service.
- Invoice saving year 1 £9,000, and in year 2 £18,000 (£27000 over 2 years).

Ownership

Appropriate owners from the Corporation and the City Police are still to be identified, however the project recommended that account management should be via the City of London Police's Corporate Media team and system admin by IT – City of London Corporation.

Work stream 8

Free/Busy Calendar Sharing between City Police and Corporation.

Status: Activity halted at closure of project

Ownership:None

Purpose of work stream

To allow Corporation and City Police staff to see free busy information for each other.

Outputs/outcome

- Requirement identified to help with joint working.
- Analysis carried out.
- Report written for Technical Design Authority.
- Verbal response from IMS to say the solution proposal does not meet security requirements

Work stream 9

Shared Health and Wellbeing Calendar – Health and Wellbeing partners.

Status: Complete

Ownership: DCCS – City of London Corporation

Purpose of work stream

An external calendar for all of the H&W partners to put details of events, consultations to ensure they are joined up.

Outputs/outcomes

- Requirement identified, at H&WAG, will help with joint working.
- Implementation and roll out to partners, City Police, Public Health etc.
- An external calendar for all of the H&W partners to put details of events, consultations to ensure they are joined up.

Work stream 10

Action Cams to visualise commuter journeys.

Status: Activity halted

Ownership:

Purpose of work stream

As part of road danger reduction to record a number of commutes via walking, cycling, running to show issues faced in the City.

Outputs/outcomes

- Analysis carried out.
- Rejected due to privacy issues.

Work stream 11

Housing ASB Process.

Status: Activity halted at closure of programme

Ownership: Process maps provided to Barbican Estate Housing – City of London Corporation.

Purpose of work stream

In preparation for the procurement of a Housing ASB solution. Safer Communities captured 'as is' process. Suggesting how process could be shortened and refined.

Outputs/outcomes

- Analysis carried out.
- Housing ASB process mapped out. Suggested improvements to process.
- Risk assessment activity carried out more quickly.
- As part of the ASB IT solution procured by Housing.

Work stream 12

Contribution to the Joint Suicide Prevention Strategy.

Status: Activity stopped on project. Subsequently completed by Corporation staff.

Ownership: Community Safety team, Public Health, M&CP, DCCS – City of London Corporation.

Purpose of work stream

To support the activities of Department of Community and Children's Services in creating a joint suicide prevention strategy and actions to improve the wellbeing of those suffering from mental health issues.

Outputs/outcomes

- Supporting data gathering for analytics for the strategy. Data gathered from City Police, BTP. Requested from London Ambulance Service
- Supporting action plan for joint suicide prevention strategy. Linking into river cameras.
- Water responder training offered to riverside businesses
- Royal Life Saving Society training to be considered for City Police staff.

Work stream 13

Contribution to City Lighting Strategy.

Status: Activity will continue as part of Secure City Programme

Ownership: Department of Built Environment. – City of London Corporation. Secure City Programme

Purpose of work stream

- Supporting Contribution to the creation of the strategy and ensuring feedback and consultation from City Police resources as well as investigating links into the JCCR.
- Opportunity raised and agreed for FCR/JCCR to have access to control system for lighting.
- One Safe City attend Demo.
- Helped to request contribution from other key partners.

Work stream 14

Out of Hours – Noise Complaints – Agile Delivery.

Status: Complete

Ownership: Town Clerks Department - Corporation of London (Contact Centre)

- Markets and Consumer Protection.

Purpose of work stream

The out of hours noise reporting process was over complex and creating customer complaints as well as causing issues with compliance with SLA.

Outputs/outcomes

- Change to the call handling process for noise complaints.
- Callers who contact the City of London Corporation are able to select number and get directed automatically to the appropriate team, rather than going through the Security desk.
- Calls are dealt with more efficiently and effectively.
- Calls can be measured and analysed, giving accurate figures on the number of noise complaints handled.

Work stream 15

Security Cross Cutting Review.

Status: Activity continues via Richard Woolford

Ownership: Town Clerks Department - Corporation of London.

Purpose of work stream

Work to improve security measures at 4 key Corporation buildings. This linked in with One Safe City as it involved CCTV and joint working initiatives.

Outputs/outcomes

Recommendations around JCCR carrying out CCTV monitoring functions for buildings and iMS-DRS being the video management system for building CCTV.

Work stream 16

Tannoy System.

Status: Activity halted.

Ownership: To be agreed but should be considered as part of Secure City

Purpose of work stream

There is a public address system installed in 2006 which can broadcast announcements via speakers within the City. The system is analogue, has been tested once but has never used operationally and is currently not connected.

Outputs/outcome

Discussion stage only

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Appendix A

Briefing note OSC003/SC001

Information Management Escalation – Corporate Responsibility for administration of information sharing

Purpose

The Safer Communities project is working on a number of tasks related to the theme of information sharing:

1. Create an intranet page specifically about information sharing
2. Create and populate an information sharing agreement register
3. Create an overarching information sharing agreement for the City and its partners.

The issue is that there is no business as usual resource to hand the work over to. Similar attempts to create a register in 2008 subsequently failed because there was no resource to maintain them.

Link to SC project risk

There is no specific risk in the register; there are associated risks, CSR008, CSR011. This will be added to the RAID log as an issue (it is currently happening) as 'There is no individual or team to hand Information Sharing to, so it is kept up to date.'

Background

There are intranet pages on Data Protection, which are mostly maintained by the Access to Information Team, although this is not their primary function. The majority of their role is taken up assisting departments with requests around Freedom of Information and Data Protection as well as providing support around information sharing agreements.

There are no specific information management or admin functions, which mean that where they do support information sharing agreements, they cannot, follow up on whether they are put in place. Closing this loop is vital in terms of ensuring we have an accurate register. Ideally ISAs and similar documents should be reviewed annually by the bodies responsible for setting them up. The register would be an ideal way of flagging up reviews.

A team, group or individual with responsibility and accountability will enable these documents to be reviewed, revised, retired, replaced etc. In the City Police there is an Information Management Board (IMB) with representation from each of the Police Directorates with a single point of contact responsible for information management.

A similar model will work at the City, it will enable individuals within IT and Access to Information to escalate issues to a group with cross-representation.

In the City Police the IMB is chaired by the Assistant Commissioner, at the City there are a number of options for who could chair:

1. The SIRO (Comptroller),
2. The CIO/IT Director
3. Assistant Town Clerk; ultimately responsible for Community Safety and consequently information sharing?
4. Director of DCCS. The majority of information sharing agreements involves DCCS.

It is not within the scope of the information sharing work stream to create posts/roles; it potentially contradicts the concept of efficiencies; however there is little point in implementing something, where there is nothing to hand over to?

Recommendation

Implement an Information Management Group at the City, appoint a suitable chair or rotate the chair. Give this group responsibility and accountability for reporting on information management back into Summit and Policy and Resources.

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Richard Woolford	10/16		Programme SRO
Chris Butler	10/16		One Safe City Programme Manager

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	05/10/16	Gary Griffin	First draft
0.2	12/10/16	Chris Butler	Amendments, inclusion of risk numbers

Appendix B

Briefing Note OSC012/SC004 update

Information Management Escalation – Single Version of the Truth

Purpose

- 1) The Safer Communities Project has observed, confirmed by other services, such as Community Safety, that there is no central information bank for core information about the City. For example, how many residents are there, how many businesses, workers in those businesses?
- 2) When a service produces information, it tends to start from scratch. In terms of service planning, what data are services, including City Police, using to resource those services?

Link to Safer Communities project risk

- 1) There is no specific risk in the register related to this. However the risk is that service provision is being based on inaccurate data. The project covers information sharing. Core information about the City needs to be the heart of information sharing.

Background

- 1) The briefing note OSC012/SC004 was approved at OSCB with a request that a discussion be held with Paul Beckett to provide the definitive position. A meeting was held with members of Paul's team:
 - Laura Davison - Head of Research, Economic Development,
 - Stuart O'Callaghan - Monitoring & Information Team Leader and
 - Peter Shadbolt - Assistant Director (Planning Policy)to discuss the original briefing note and the options within it.
- 2) At that meeting it was agreed that the page on the City website with FAQs under Business should be expanded to include data on residents. The data on this page is kept up to date by Planning Policy.

Problem Statement

- 1) There [are pages](#) on the City website with "key data" which are out of date.
- 2) There was a group, EDCOG (Economic Development Chief Officers Group), which met to discuss strategy documents and the use of data. This allowed cross-cutting discussion of the use of data and the right data to use in the right context. This was superseded with the implementation of the cross cutting steering groups, People, Place and Prosperity.
- 3) In strategy documents, there is different statistical information about the number of workers, businesses etc. there is also a lack of reference to where the data origin and date. Data, such as people and businesses obviously changes over time so ensuring that a figure is time stamped is crucial in ensuring it can be seen in context. E.g. a population figure from 2011 for 2016 can be seen as a forecast and can be treated as less accurate than actual data from 2015.
- 4) Who is the single point of contact for reference data about the City?

- a. The Planning Policy team have gathered together the information under Business on the Corporation website, so they would seem like an obvious place to start. However, how much time and effort might be used in their becoming the go-to team for this? This should also be extended to the City Police to ensure that any reference data is collated together in one place.
- 5) We must focus on aggregated, depersonalised data that is of interest both internally and externally so there are no issues with sharing. The website is an ideal vehicle for holding this information as it can answer and prevent FOI requests etc.
 - 6) If anyone uses forecast information, it is imperative to cite the source and the basis for that forecast.
 - 7) There is awareness that research data carried out in services and projects and useful statistics and data identified for reuse.
 - a. This information is currently siloed.
 - b. Find somewhere to store this, which might be internal, [Citymaps](#) as an example or external, London Data Store.
 - 8) A future model of operation might include taking data feeds from other sites, e.g. ONS via the National Information Infrastructure API and displaying it within City pages. This will reduce the need to update these pages manually.

Briefing Note Recommendations / Recommended Next Steps

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
Rename FAQs about the City to Key Facts under Business.	Planning Policy Web Editor, Melissa Richardson	Feb 17	
Set the single point of contact for key data, (should be a team). Then communicate that information out. Ensure that communication includes the link to the FAQ/Key Facts page as the primary source of data. The economic research email address is the most likely point of contact.	Policy and Resources, Planning Policy	Mar 17	

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
<p>'Policy and Resources' and 'Corporate Strategy and Performance' point anyone working on service/business planning, committee papers or strategy documents to the FAQ/Key Facts page and the SPOC.</p>	<p>Safer Communities Project, Policy and Resources, Corporate Strategy and Performance</p>	<p>Mar 17</p>	
<p>Change any out of date data on the website and ensure links are added to point to the FAQ/Key Facts page. Keep the link to the Development and Population page which has more granular Issue guidance to editors to avoid including direct data (if necessary it must include a source and date) but preferably to point to the FAQ/Key Facts page instead.</p>	<p>Melissa Richardson</p>	<p>Mar 17</p>	
<p>Look at setting up a "Data Conference" for internal City and City Police staff to be run once and look at key data sources as well as what research and data sources have been collected. From this identify if this should be run annually and align with service and business planning.</p>	<p>Safer Communities Project</p>	<p>Mar 17 (set up)</p>	
<p>Identify a suitable repository for any additional research and data sources. This could be internal, such as Citymaps or external such as LDS.</p>	<p>Safer Communities Project</p>	<p>Mar 17</p>	
<p>Require that every document which references a statistic has to include the source of that data as well as the date. This includes forecasting information where a citation of where that forecast has come from must be</p>	<p>Corporate Strategy and Performance</p>	<p>Feb 17</p>	

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
included.			

Programme Board Decision

To be determined

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Cmdr. Woolford	16/01/17	CoLP	Programme SRO
Chris Butler	16/01/17	CoLC	One Safe City Programme Manager
Kate Smith	27/01/17	CoLC	Head of Corporate Strategy and Performance

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	11/01/2017	Gary Griffin	Draft document created.
0.2	12/01/2017	Chris Butler	First Revision
1.0	16/01/2017	Gary Griffin	Final version for distribution

Appendix C

Information Sharing Register (extract)

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
1	MOU between M&CP and City Police	Final	Memorandum of Understanding	M&CP, CoLP	Overarching MOU for joint working for the Public Protection Service, Built Environment, Transportation and Public Realm and City Police
2	Street Trading Protocol	0.1	Memorandum of Understanding	M&CP, CoLP	Made under paragraph 5(f) of MOU
3	Charity Collections Protocol	0.1	Memorandum of Understanding	M&CP, CoLP	Made under paragraph 5(l) of MOU
4	MARAC Operating Protocol		Operational Protocol	CoL, CoLP, Probation Service, Health, Victim Support	Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference. The objective of this Protocol is to act as a terms of reference and guidance for MARAC members during the course of agreed information sharing between multi-partnership agencies at MARAC meetings.

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
5	London Crime and Disorder Partnership DAAT	2	Information Sharing Protocol	CoL, CoLP, C&HPCT, LFS, LPS	The purpose of this Protocol is to facilitate the lawful exchange of information, whether it be personal, sensitive, depersonalised or anonymised, between co-operating agencies which have the common aim of reducing crime and disorder, and the misuse of drugs, in the City of London.
6	London Resilience Partnership - Strategic Coordination Protocol	6.5	Information Sharing Protocol	LFS, cross London multi-agency	This Protocol (formerly known as the Command, Control and Information Sharing Protocol), details the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for London's response to a disruptive incident. This includes an emergency, as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and major incident as defined in the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, Joint

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
					Doctrine.
7	City Hackney Information Sharing Agreement	1.5	Information Sharing Agreement	CoL, LB of Hackney, City and Hackney Urgent Healthcare Social Enterprise, Barts Health NHS Trust, East London NHS Foundation Trust, Homerton University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, St. Joseph's Hospice,	The purpose of this agreement is to facilitate the secure sharing of information amongst key NHS, Local Authority, private and voluntary organisations as strictly listed in Appendix A to support closer integration and the provision of effective and efficient health and social care services to the populations of the local area. The agreement is also aimed at ensuring that the correct balance is achieved between the duty to care and the duty to share for direct healthcare

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
					purposes.
8	City of London Corporation Safer City Partnership CCM	Final	Information Sharing Protocol	CoL, CoLP, Probation Service, Health, Victim Support	This protocol supports the delivery of the work of the City of London Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour Multi-Agency Panel (“the Panel”). The Crime and ASB Panel includes representation from core agencies/partners in the City of London and meets to address complex and high risk cases. A meeting of the Panel may be known as a City Community Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (“CCM” / “City Community MARAC”).

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
					This document sets out the framework for the sharing of information for these purposes
9	MOPI - Managing Police Information	Second	Information Sharing Agreement	CoLP	Information within MOPI about how and why Police should share information with other agencies. Information is from page 60 onwards.
10	TBA - DCCS ISA			TBA	Awaiting copy.... Note from e-mail."23. Legal implications There are legal implications around data sharing. There is a data governance group as part of the project which the City of London Corporation sits on. A draft data

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
					sharing agreement has been prepared and this has been reviewed and commented on by the City of London Solicitor and Comptroller."
11	Information Sharing Agreement	1.0	Information Sharing Agreement	CoL, CoLP	This agreement outlines the requirements between the City of London Police and the City of London Corporation to work together to provide a framework for action.
12	Children Missing in Education		Information Sharing Agreement	CoL, Schools	This agreement between the City Corporation and the School provides a framework for disclosure by the School to the City Corporation of the data listed in the Appendix ("the Data") for the purposes of ensuring children are receiving suitable education.

ID	Document Name	Version number	Type of document	Named Organisations	Description
13	N&ELCSU and Public Health Team	1.2	Information Sharing Agreement	CoL Public Health, NHS	To allow CoL access to the NELIE business intelligence platform as a delegated CCG.
14	NELCSU and DCCS	N/A	Data Processing Agreement	CoL DCCS, NHS	Enables the NELCSU to fulfil its commitments under MOU for invoice validation on Sexual Health Services.
15	SSISA - Homerton and DCCS	1	Information Sharing Agreement	CoL DCCS, Homerton	To provide a framework for the secure and confidential sharing of information about children between agencies within Hackney, to enable them to meet the needs, protection and support of service users in accordance with national and local policy and legislative requirements.
16	JARDU	N/A	Information Sharing Agreement	CoL, BIS, DfE	This DSP is made for the purposes of sharing data between BIS, SFA, DfE, EFA and the third parties in order to undertake a joint area review of post 16 education and training. ("the Review")

Appendix D

Briefing Note OSC015/SC007

Community Safety Accreditation Scheme, Neighbourhood / Community Wardens

Purpose

1. Prior to the enactment of the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA); police officers, supported by special constables and traffic wardens, were the only means for the service to provide the routine patrol presence which the 'public expects'. The PRA has provided the opportunity to endow police staff with limited powers to undertake a variety of uniformed patrolling tasks. The PRA also enables Chief Officers to accredit and quality assure other members of the extended police family who, unlike PCSOs, are not directly employed by the police, with the intention of harnessing the commitment of those already involved in community safety, crime reduction and reassurance.

Background

2. Under Section 40 of the Police Reform Act 2002, the Chief Officer of any police Force may establish and maintain a Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS) in order that some powers normally available to constables or others may be conferred on persons accredited under the scheme.
3. 3.4 Section 40 stipulates that a CSAS can be established if the Chief Officer considers it appropriate for the purposes of:
 - a. contributing to community safety AND
 - b. in co-operation with the police force for the area, combating crime and disorder, public nuisance and other forms of antisocial behaviour.
4. There are a number of areas within the City where enforcement could be carried out by the City of London Corporation or third parties, releasing City of London Police time and resources to carry out critical Police functions.
5. As an example within Essex Police and South Yorkshire Police, CSAS accredited staff, have powers to tackle graffiti, litter, abandoned cars and anti-social behaviour.
6. The granting of enforcement powers would also allow existing City of London Corporation or other third parties to carry out minor enforcement duties during events.
7. PCSOs were introduced by the Home Office to help the Police, the issue is they are funded out of the Police budget, CSAS is funded from other sources and accredited staff are not employees of the Police. The costs of CSAS are outside the Police budget.

8. The granting of these powers is given by the Chief Officer of the Police Force, the Commissioner of City of London Police.

Problem Statement

1. CSAS was introduced nationally due to recognition that Police resources were being taken up with minor enforcement, not resulting in criminal charges, which could be carried out by other organisations.
2. There is increased financial pressure on the City Police with an expectation of continued excellent service. The role of the Police has changed with a requirement to provide a more visual armed presence on the City of London streets.
3. With the current terrorism threat level as **Severe** then the ability to have access to staff who can carry out a number of enforcement functions is very important. CSAS can give powers to stop and direct traffic, which during an event would free up Police Officers to deal with other priorities, including armed response.
4. With the increase in the number of pedestrians and cyclists in the City, there is increased pressure on the roads and pavements. Using a Police officer to carry out this minor enforcement is neither cost effective nor good use of Police time. Also with the increase in armed Police officers, we will have the issue of armed police stopping cyclists for cycling on the pavement or running a red light? CSAS can ensure that criminal proceedings and Police resources are only used where most appropriate.
5. CSAS can support the night time economy using night time patrols to prevent low level anti-social behaviour and identifying issues earlier to the City of London Corporation and the City of London Police.
6. The recording of certain types of crime might be lower than it should be, for issues such as hate crime and near misses with cyclists etc. Having a warden street presence is more likely to allow people to report issues, especially if those wardens were seen as being effective at reducing things such as anti-social behaviour. Tasking can allocate CSAS resources to patrol areas with a perceived issue to provide intelligence to back up further activity.
7. The correct tasking and deployment of CSAS resources will help provide high quality intelligence to ensure that Police and City resources are deployed correctly for further enforcement.
8. CSAS will empower those Corporation of London departments and other bodies who deal with neighbourhood and licensing issues without Police involvement, so avoiding duplication of effort and criminalising those individuals.
9. There are other areas such as the bridges which have issues around attempted suicides and illegal food stalls. CSAS resources can be allocated to patrol at the times when these issues are most likely to occur. In terms of street trading, CSAS resources can link up with the Police, Trading Standards

and other authorities to provide a preventative presence as well as ensuring that issues are not displaced into other boroughs.

10. CSAS is about providing visible reassurance to the community that community safety issues are being dealt with.
11. It is not about income generation. Although under CSAS there is the power to issue fines and penalty charges, anecdotal evidence shows this has not happened to any great extent in local authorities that have implemented CSAS. If a private company is given CSAS powers this can prevent a culture of performance by income being created.
12. The intention is that CSAS patrols provide a preventative presence and better background intelligence for Police operations.
13. CSAS does not replace Policing. Where criminality is identified; the Police will engage, the advantage being that CSAS staff will be able to offer on the ground intelligence and background information to ensure better outcomes.
14. CSAS grants additional enforcement powers to existing community safety services, e.g. the requirement to give a name and address making them more effective.

Options

Existing City Staff

1. Within the City there are as an example Street Environment Officers. They could be given CSAS powers to perform further duties, including issuing fines. This is an ideal opportunity to use existing enforcement resource more effectively.
2. The CSAS powers have been mapped against a list of capabilities and the City and City Police Sections that deliver those capabilities. Further work will be carried out to identify opportunities within City Teams currently carrying out enforcement activities, which would benefit from CSAS powers.

Using TfL

1. Transport for London have a London wide team of 80 Road Traffic Enforcement Officers who have been accredited by the Metropolitan Police to carry out a number of CSAS activities, these are listed in appendix A. These are at the discretion of the Commissioner and can be amended.
2. These resources could be used by the City of London, in recognition of its important status as a major transport hub, including critical bridge infrastructures.
3. There would need to be joint tasking and priority setting from City and City Police Road Safety teams.
4. <https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/media/press-releases/2015/november/test1>

Using Parkguard

1. Parkguard provide a Neighbourhood Warden Service for the three social housing estates. They deal with a persistent range of low level nuisance.

This service started in August 2015 and has been extended for a further 2 years as of September 2016.

2. This service compliments other services provided by the City and City Police and provides high-visibility evening patrols of the three estates for a total of 50 hours per week.
3. The patrols are targeted and intelligence-led, increasing presence at certain times and in response to reports of issues. Patrols are increased at times of the year where nuisance may be greater (e.g. end of October - early November, New Year's Eve)
4. Staff are uniformed, and work as single person units or, at times of greater risk, two-person crews. They particularly focus on hot spot localities identified by the public and the police.
5. A valuable aspect of the Parkguard service is the intelligence provided to partner agencies. Detailed reports are produced for each shift and circulated to the police, the Housing Service, the Community Safety Team, the Homelessness Team and Environmental Health. This has provided all parties with a granular level of intelligence which would not have otherwise been available. It is extremely valuable in identifying issues at the earliest stage – alerting officers to the first signs of drug use or rough sleeping on the estate, to fly tipping, trespass or security and maintenance issues which we can then take immediate action on. It also gives us a very clear picture of the level of activity on our estates and allows any patterns to be identified.
6. Although the functions Parkguard carry out on the estates are in line with CSAS activities, they do not have the power of enforcement. So they can request a name and address but cannot require it.
7. The process of approval is different for private sector and public sector organisations. Private Sector, such as Parkguard will apply to ACPO CPI Ltd and they will recommend whether their staff should be accredited. It is still the Commissioner who decides to grant approval or not.

Community / Neighbourhood / Street Wardens

1. An option is a team of wardens, employed managed and tasked directly by the Corporation Community Safety Manager. These could work alongside the existing City Street Enforcement Officers, TfL and Parkguard. They could also be an alternative to Parkguard services on housing estates in the near future.
2. As an example, Hackney has 14 wardens patrolling 24 hours a day, covering an area of 7.36 sq. mi. and a population of 272,890. They carry out around 200-300 interventions a month, the majority are fixed penalty notices and intelligence gathering and referrals to other agencies. They have also carried out nearly 100 warnings for cycling infringements, e.g. cycling on the pavement as well as fixed penalties and warnings for illegal street trading.
3. The function of the street wardens would be broadly in line with other functions within the City such as the Hampstead Heath Constabulary and Epping Forest Keepers.
4. Salaries for Community Wardens range from £17,000 to £30,000 per annum. A team of 5 wardens would cost in the range of £200,000 per annum, which would include training, vetting, uniforms, not paid from Police budgets.

Security Staff / Door Supervisors

1. As part of the night time economy, security organisations can be accredited which would allow a subset of the powers to be enforced to tackle anti-social behaviour outside venues.
2. Security staff within larger business premises could also be accredited; members of the Griffin Guard might be an option, to allow them in the event of a critical incident to be able to be tasked by City Resilience to carry out traffic management etc.
3. Licensed premises may be interested in CSAS accrediting their staff as it provides powers to prevent anti-social behaviour on their premises.
4. As with Parkguard the process of approval for security organisations will be different to public sector.

Cheapside Business Alliance Ambassadors

1. The Cheapside Business Alliance employs a number of ambassadors, who carry out a number of community functions covering the Cheapside business district.
2. They are involved in community safety functions, including air quality monitoring, recording anti-social behaviour and street cleansing issues.
3. Giving them enforcement powers would enable them to have a more forceful role, but this may change the dynamic.
4. Vetting may also lead to employment issues for the ambassadors.
5. There will be further discussions with the CBA to see whether CBA ambassadors can be considered for accreditation.

Risks

1. Parkguard carry out a good service on the housing estates, however because of the general low levels of crime there could be little for them to do in terms of extra enforcement. This may be seen as demonstrating no need for CSAS.
2. In other places, although community warden schemes have been seen as a success, they have been subject to savings. CSAS should help City Police make efficiencies; if the CSAS budget is put under pressure then the expectation may be that it will fall back to the Police to carry out minor enforcement.
3. If existing resources are accredited, there is a risk that they will fail vetting. This may lead to an effective individual being forced out of a role, which could have a counter-productive effect of making the community feel less secure.
4. More people on the streets might lead to reporting increasing and therefore the number of recorded instances going up. This needs to be understood at the start and that the increase of intelligence will give a clearer picture of what is happening.
5. Information exchange may be an issue. At the moment if a Police Officer records an issue, this may be recorded on the Police National Computer. CSAS accredited staff would need to have a mechanism to record issues through Administration of Justice (AOJ).
6. Getting City services to sign up. One of the concerns voiced is that there are by-laws and legislative powers at the moment that allow City staff to carry out some of these functions. Because of the threat of violence, real or perceived they want a Police presence. Will also need to amend terms and conditions of some City staff and make vetting a pre-requisite of the job, see point 3.

Financial Model

1. Funding will be sought from provider departments such as DCCS who are paying for this service at present.
2. The late night levy could be used to fund further wardens, focussed on the night time economy and anti-social behaviour after 12am.
3. The new extension to Parkguard includes the ability to 'spot purchase' enhancements up to the value of £100K pa or a total of £200K over the two years. Additional services could be funded by the late night levy and/or the funding for PCSOs.

What needs to be in place?

1. Before an organisation is accredited the Commissioner is required by the PRA 2002 to ensure:
 - a. The employing organisation must have a satisfactory complaints procedure (PRA 2002 40[9]).
 - b. The employing organisation must be fit and proper person to supervise the work of an AP (PRA 2002 41[4a]).
 - c. The employee is suitable to exercise the powers that are to be conferred upon him (PRA 2002 41[4b]).
 - d. The employee is capable of effectively carrying out the functions for the purpose of which these powers are being conferred upon him (PRA 2002 41[4c]).
 - e. The employee has received adequate training for the exercise of these powers (PRA 2002 41[4d]).
2. A CSAS co-ordinator role; a Police employee would be the single point of contact between the Police and the CSAS organisation(s). They would be responsible for
 - ensuring that all accredited persons have had adequate training,
 - carry out quality assurance and do occasional patrols with accredited staff.
 - be the point where complaints about CSAS accredited staff and organisations are received.
 - This could be:
 - i. Supt. Ops (or replacement)
 - ii. Insp. Ops Community Policing
 - iii. Ch. Insp. UPD
 - iv. Sgt. ACPO
 - v. CoLP Human Resources
4. A list of all of the accredited persons must be kept and good practice suggests the names and working locations of approved organisations are available on the City Police website.
5. An amendment of resourcing within the Administration of Justice service. The expectation will be that more enforcement will be carried out and therefore additional resource will be required to monitor the progress of that enforcement.
6. All staff applying for accreditation will be vetted, NPPV level 2 if access to Police premises or systems is required or NPPV level 1 otherwise.
7. A reasonable fee can be charged for the admin costs of accreditation including vetting, for example the Met charges:
 - b. Set up costs 2016
 - i. Initial organisation application: £1,250 plus VAT
 - ii. Processing fee for each Director and Authorised Signatory: £30

- iii. Training (arranged by organisation): Average cost around £300 per accredited person
 - iv. Admin Charge per newly Accredited Person: £150
 - c. On-going Costs
 - i. 3 yearly renewal of application (Organisation): £750.00 plus VAT
 - ii. Annual charge per accredited person: £100 per annum
- 8. Any unlawful conduct carried out by any CSAS accredited employees is the responsibility of their employer, not the accrediting organisation, e.g. City Police. However the co-ordinating officer must ensure that any complaints are managed and accreditation removed from any staff no longer meeting vetting standards.
- 9. The guidance recommends routing organisation accreditation requests through the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership for consultation, with the Chief Officer making the final decision.
- 10. The CSAS process requires that an organisation requests accreditation and this **should** be for no longer than 12 months, which means there will be an annual review. However after the first year, the accreditation can be granted for up to 3 years, although ACPO guidance 2012 recommends annually for private companies.

Options

1. Directly employ a team of wardens under the tasking control of the Community Safety Manager. The size of the team to be between 4 and 5 people.
2. Accredite TfL RTEO staff to carry out road danger reduction work alongside existing City/City Police Road Safety teams. These staff would be jointly tasked with City/City Police staff.
3. Accredite Parkguard staff to carry out CSAS functions within the areas currently covered by their contract with DCCS.
4. Accredite Parkguard staff and enhance the contract with additional responsibilities. Focus on areas of known ASB as well as patrolling bridges during peak hours for illegal street sellers and also attempted suicide(s).
5. Initially accredit TfL and Parkguard staff enhancing their contract with additional patrol areas. Use this as a dry run before putting in place a team of wardens. There is an advantage to this in that TfL and Parkguard already have trained and vetted staff, which could be deployed quickly.

Briefing Note Recommendations / Recommended Next Steps

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
<p>1. Implement Option 5 will be the fastest to deploy and enable the gathering of intelligence to right-size the warden team. TfL and Parkguard have trained / vetted staff. This will include joint tasking of the resources by Road Danger Reduction and Community Safety.</p>	<p>Safer Communities Board</p>	<p>Nov 16</p>	<p>CoLP SMB CPA Police Committee</p>
<p>2. Produce a further report on the implementation of a warden's team as well as looking at accrediting other staff, such as security staff.</p>	<p>Safer Communities Project Manager Community Safety Manager Supt Community Policing</p>	<p>Mar 17</p>	<p>Safer Communities Board</p>

Next Steps

1. Agree in principle with Safer Community Project Board Chair(s).
2. Submit report to the Safer Community Project Board for discussion and decision.
3. Submit report to One Safe City Programme Board for discussion and decision.
4. Submit report to ACPO / SMB for discussion and decision.
5. Safer Communities works with ACPO on liaising with Crime Reduction Partnership on the organisations seeking staff accreditation.
6. Subject to approval Safer Communities project plans implementation of CSAS powers with City of London Corporation and City of London Police.
7. Organisations submit request to Commissioner asking for CSAS accreditation.

Review proposals after 6 months under business as usual Dec 17 Programme Board Decision

1. Agree recommendations by number

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Richard Woolford	21/11/2016	City of London Police	Programme SRO
Steve Presland	21/11/2016	Corporation of London	Transportation & Public Realm Director, Built Environment
Chris Butler	23/09/2016	OSC	OSC PMO Manager

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	23/09/16	Gary Griffin	First draft
0.2	23/09/16	Chris Butler	PMO Manager review
0.5	30/09/16	Gary Griffin	Amended version from PMO review sent to Cmdr. Woolford
0.6	14/10/16	Gary Griffin	Amendments from Cmdr. Woolford review

Glossary

Term	Description
CPA	Crime Prevention Association
CSAS	Community Safety Accreditation Scheme
DCCS	Department of Community and Children's Services
FIB	Force Information Bureau (Information and Intelligence Directorate)
MARAC	Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conferences
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
OSC	One Safe City Programme
SCP	Safer City Partnership (The Community Safety Partnership)
SMB	City Police Senior Management Board
UPD	Uniformed Policing Directorate

Appendix E

Briefing Note OSC019/SC011

Update on Messaging Tool progress

Purpose

- 3) To inform the Safer Communities and One Safe City boards about the current position with the procurement of the messaging tool to replace Everbridge and also VisaV

Link to CSR017 project risk

- 2) There is a project risk relating to the procurement and replacement and the impact on existing contracts.

Background

- 1) The project was tasked with ensuring the system used by City Police for critical messaging was replaced as part of a procurement process.
- 2) A novation document was signed in December 2015 to recognize the fact that the original contract was in the name of Vocal. This set out terms for continued use.
- 3) City Police identified issues with the existing Everbridge product:
 - a. It is expensive when compared to competitor products
 - b. Its feature set is not as rich as competitor products
 - c. Some subscribers are charged for receiving messages
- 4) The project worked with City and City Police teams, including City Procurement, Legal, ECD, I&I, Community Policing, City Police Communications, M&CP, DBE and Resilience and Contingency to produce a specification and brief and carried out a procurement exercise to select a replacement which met the messaging needs of the City and City Police.
- 5) A contract cancellation letter was sent to Everbridge on 19 October 2016 in line with the terms of the novation document to ensure the Everbridge City Police contract ended on 16 December 2016.
 - a. Everbridge responded on 17 November by telephone asking which contract the cancellation letter applied to. Legal informed them the letter clearly stated it was related to the novation agreement in December 2015.
- 6) The request for bids for a new tool started on 1 November and ended on 17 November. 6 suppliers were contacted, 4 bid.
- 7) These bids were assessed in two panels and a decision made on a preferred supplier.

Problem Statement

- 1) On 24 November 2016 Everbridge asked about the position with the procurement. The possibility of a month extension should the procurement take longer to get through internal processes was raised with Everbridge. They replied stating the City Police contract ran until Feb 2019.
- 2) Everbridge sent the Safer Communities project a copy of a signed document which was a quote signed in February 2016 for 3 years plus 2 optional years. This document had not been seen before by the project and was not referenced in any of the reports about the Everbridge contract position; which all stated 30 days' notice to end the contract in mid-December.

- 3) The project engaged Legal to identify a way forward with the assertion that the terms in the novation were primary and that the signed document was a quote. The project and Legal met with the Everbridge MD and their legal counsel. They are stating that they have a binding contract for the service. Legal has sent some emails to Everbridge from one of their employees as part of the discussions to produce the quotation. These may be interpreted to say that 30 days' notice can cancel the contract at any time, Everbridge have stated that this refers to the period after the 3 years of the quotation has ended.
- 4) As this is now placing the ECD contractual position under pressure, Gary Griffin met with City Procurement and it was agreed that City Procurement would engage with VisaV to look for a 6 month extension while we resolve the contractual issues.
- 5) Gary Griffin has contacted ECD with a view to amending the specification to reflect their needs in isolation, in preparation for the revised procurement.
- 6) The procurement for the new tool has been cancelled and the bidders informed.
- 7) This has also placed pressure on Resilience and Contingency within the City who are on the older iModus messaging platform and are being pressured into moving onto Everbridge. They were hoping to move instead on to the new tool, which met their needs more closely. The project will be working with R&C to ensure their messaging continues and they are migrated onto an alternative successfully.

Options

- For information only

Briefing Note Recommendations / Recommended Next Steps

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
For information			

Programme Board Decision

To be determined

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Chris Butler	16/12/2016	OSC	One Safe City Programme Manager
Gary Griffin	14/12/2016	OSC	Safer Communities Project Manager

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
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0.1	14 Dec 2016	Gary Griffin	Draft document created
0.2	14 Dec 2016	Chris Butler	Amendments – tracked changes
0.3	15 Dec 2016	Gary Griffin	Acceptance and editing of tracked changes
0.4	16 Dec 2016	Gary Griffin	Updated with information about procurement status.
1.0	16 Dec 2016	Gary Griffin	Final version issued to Safer Communities Project Board

Appendix F

Briefing Note OSC021/SC013

Messaging Tool – procurement of ECD Neighbourhood Alerts System following on from Everbridge contractual position

Purpose

- 4) To outline the next stages of the process now that the Everbridge contractual situation has been resolved.

Link to CSR017 project risk

- 3) There is a project risk relating to the procurement and replacement and the impact on existing contracts.

Background

- 1) The ECD contract for Action Fraud alerts, has been extended for a further 6 months. The contract has a 90 day termination clause within it, based on the complexity of the system and its interoperability with other agencies, Neighbourhood Watch groups etc.
- 2) Work is progressing with Everbridge around exploiting the solution to its maximum potential.

Problem Statement

- 8) The procurement included ECD as part of the Safer Communities project's overall objectives of joint working and delivering efficiencies. Having a single supplier with a single contract for the City of London, Police and ECD would make invoicing, account management etc. much more straightforward. There were also potentials for cashable savings as a single solution would have been much cheaper than multiple contracts in place.
- 9) However now the two requirements have been contractually separated, the projects involvement in the national tool should come to an end. The project has a clear scope and remit around communities within the City of London and cannot really be extended to include the now separate national ECD requirement
- 10) The project effort will now be focused on engagement with City communities and with the exploitation of the capabilities of the Everbridge platform for community messaging. Therefore effort to re-run the procurement will have to be at the expense of other activities.
- 11) The project is also only currently funded to the end of March. The procurement process will extend beyond this.

Options

- 1) Safer Communities project resources deliver the procurement process for the replacement of the national Action Fraud alerts system. This will be at the expense of other project activities. Approximate effort required would be 40 days over 6 months, 30 day's project management, 10 days business analysis.
- 2) Safer Communities project resource helps and supports the procurement process for the replacement of the national Action Fraud alerts system. This

will require much less resource, but will still be at the expense of other activities. Approximate effort would be 10 days, 5 days project management, 5 days business analysis. The scope of involvement would have to be carefully monitored to ensure it does not develop into option 1.

- 3) The Safer Communities project resource has no involvement in the procurement of the national Action Fraud alerts system. Any work carried out during the previous procurement will be handed over to ECD resources and ad-hoc support can be given. Approximate effort required would be 2 days, 1 day project management, and 1 day business analysis.

Briefing Note Recommendations / Recommended Next Steps

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
Based on the scope of the Safer Communities project implement option 3	Gary Griffin	18 Jan 2017	SC Board

Programme Board Decision

To be determined

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Cmdr. Woolford / Steve Presland	18/01/2017	City of London Police / Corporation of London	Programme SRO
Chris Butler	12/01/2017	OSC	One Safe City Programme Manager

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	15/12/2016	Gary Griffin	Draft created
1.0	12/01/2017	Gary Griffin	Final version presented to Safer Communities Project Board

Appendix G

Briefing Note OSC027/SC019

Re-Implementation of Critical Messaging Tool

Purpose

To set out the re-implementation of the Everbridge critical message tool in the City of London Corporation and the City of London Police.

This Document Links to

- Briefing Note OSC019/SC011-Messaging Tool
- Briefing Note OSC021/SC013-Messaging Tool Next Steps

Background

1. The City of London Police has used iModus and its successor Everbridge, for more than 10 years for critical/priority messaging. There has been no formal procurement process during that time.
2. The Corporation has also used iModus now Everbridge with two separate contracts, for internal messaging within Markets and Consumer Protection (M&CP) and Resilience and Contingency. Department of Built Environment (DBE) are using the M&CP instance to also carry out internal messaging. These are invoiced separately to the City Police Everbridge contract.
3. A procurement process was started in October 2016, including requirements for wider community messaging also to combine contracts into a single contract, with savings for both the Corporation and City Police. This procurement has now been cancelled due to the discovery of a contractual obligation to continue with the use of the existing tool until 2019. Please see Briefing Note OSC019/SC011.

Problem Statement

1. Since the tool was set up for City Police in 2015/16 whether it does what was intended has never been reviewed. There is a sense that the tool is not fit for purpose, although this has not been brought to the attention of Everbridge. M&CP and DBE are using the system successfully and are happy with its functionality.
2. There was some confusion about what the tool could do for the City Police and the subsequent implementation was based around functionality that the system could not deliver, so the tool was configured as a general messaging tool, with different groups being used to send different messages, however this isn't how the system is being used.
3. The tool was set up for City Police with a number of groups, the main ones being Corporate Partners, Residents and SMEs. There is confusion as to who should be subscribed to which group and the types of messages they should be receiving.
4. What is a critical/priority message? This has not been fully defined but is essential to the proper implementation and use of this or any tool. The power

of a critical alert is that when something is sent out, the recipient knows they will have to react to it.

5. There is frustration and concern from subscribers to the service, they **are not** getting the messages they expect if they get messages at all – this is unacceptable. Marketing campaigns from the Police about crime and crime prevention can be used to exemplify this; they are not what recipients signed up for.
6. The Safer Communities Project has requested materials in relation to the current set up; why it was built that way and who ‘signed it off’. All avenues have been explored, including requesting build or specification documentation from the supplier. At the time of writing no material has been forthcoming. There are no build documents or specifications which identify why the current system was set up the way it was, which is a problem in terms of identifying the tools fitness for purpose.
7. Following a conversation with a Police Officer who was involved with system set-up, the intention was to have a system function permitting messages to be sent across all organisations, as an ‘Over-ride’ button. This was not implemented.
8. Police Corporate Communications team use the ‘Corporate Partners’ database for awareness campaigns only. They have no access to ‘SMEs’ and ‘Residents’.
9. Everbridge was intended as a critical/priority messaging tool and not for general communications. Evidence received from organisations that have unsubscribed suggests receipt of non-critical messages as a primary reason.
10. The Control room has access to Corporate Partners, SMEs and Residents. Everbridge states that the Control Room is using ‘Mass Notification’ or ‘Incident’, because of this, when an incident occurs only the Corporate Partners group receive messages (not SMEs and/or residents.)
11. The intent appears to have been that the Corporate Partners list receives a more detailed message as they are considered to be a ‘trusted partner’. This does not occur, at present and in terms of critical messaging is too complex a process:
 - a. Use cases were created for categories of incidents likely to occur in the City and set up as workflows.
 - b. The workflows were intended to be dynamic, but have introduced problems, for example a ‘drop down’ adds ‘**road**’ after the street name of the road, but this doesn’t work where we have street names such as ‘London Wall, Bishopsgate or Aldgate.
12. Test messages are automatically sent to all subscribers every two weeks. An undesired side-effect is that some users *only* receive test messages increasing dissatisfaction with the system.
13. Individual user accounts are not used to access the tool. Users are sharing logins and passwords which contravene security best practice. This has been raised with the CoLP Information Security Team.

14. Some subscribers are paying a fee for the use of the Everbridge tool. There is a misconception that this is required to receive critical messages, which may have result from incorrect information or a misunderstanding when City Police migrated from iModus to Everbridge.
15. There is the no clear accountability for the system and the messages sent from it and no responsibility for the administration. This is entirely separate from ownership and payment. There is no clear accountable owner of the Everbridge tool.
 - a. Appendix A shows a RACI matrix for the tool, there are gaps for super user and also account management responsibilities.
 - b. The Assistant Town Clerk is shown as the Corporation Corporate owner reflecting the responsibility for resilience and contingency.
16. No-one in CoLP Communications receives the critical alerts; there is no subject matter expert review.
17. An essential part of any messaging system must be end-user surveys relating to quality together with in-house messaging reviews.
18. The Safer Communities Project has sought feedback from;
 - a. A large International Insurance company
 - b. A large International Media and Financial Software company
 - c. A global Asset Manager and Investment House
 - d. A City of London Law firm
 - e. A minister at a City of London Church
 - f. Feedback ranged from spelling and grammatical errors to timeliness and content with general concerns over standard of messages.
19. Social media and the critical messaging tool are disconnected. In case studies, the messaging and updating of social media are not aligned. Messages must be replicated across channels.
20. Everbridge is limited to 15,000 contacts. If subscribers are on multiple lists this reduces the overall total, e.g. if the same 5,000 contacts occur in three lists, the contacts limit is reached. Multiple-entry must be removed.
21. Contacts exist multiple times across groups. So in some cases contacts receive the same message three times, being a member of three groups. This could be resolved by flattening the group structure and only having one critical messaging group.
22. The City of London Police website page '[corporate partners](#)' mentions dynamic conference calls and capturing information about location of CCTV cameras. This does not appear to be used and may cause issues with the expectations from a paid service.
23. There is one defined super user set up in the tool who works in Community and Partnerships Policing with overall responsibility for the system. This person is not a system user and they are a single point of failure. They seem to have been identified as the super user by default, rather than by an active decision on the best person for the role.

24. Everbridge are the main administrator for the City Police and Resilience and Contingency implementations. Ideally the main administrator responsibility should be within the Corporation or City Police.

Headline recommendations

The items below are just headline recommendations, once you have had the chance to review and comment on this document and agree the RACI matrix, a list of tasks will be sent out to complete the re-implementation.

- A. Bring all of the instances of Everbridge, City and City Police into a single environment, subject to agreement and financial incentive
- B. Identify and adopt, subject to agreement of RACI, accountability and responsibility for the system
- C. Only send test messages every 3 months (this has been implemented)
- D. City Police use as a critical/priority messaging tool only
- E. Ensure every user sending out a message has a separate account
- F. Ensure paying subscribers are aware what they are paying for
- G. Document everything
- H. Create procedures for use and audit

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Chris Butler	15/03/17	OSC	One Safe City Programme Manager
Carolyn Dwyer	23/03/17	CoLC	Director Department of the Built Environment
Jane Gyford	23/03/17	CoLP	T/Command Operations
Teresa La-Thangue	23/03/17	CoLP	Director of Communications
Peter Lisle	23/03/17	CoLC	Assistant Town Clerk
Bob Roberts	23/03/17	CoLC	Director of Communications
David Smith	23/03/17	CoLC	Director Markets and Consumer Protection

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	27/01/2017	Michael Cocksedge	Draft document created
0.2	07/02/2017	Gary Griffin	Comments
0.3	15/02/2017	Gary Griffin	Amendments to recommendations
0.4	20/02/2017	Michael Cocksedge/Gary Griffin	Chris Butler comments
0.5	15/03/2017	Gary Griffin	Further amendments to make briefing note more concise.
1.0	23/03/2017	Gary Griffin	Final version for Senior Managers with responsibility for Everbridge

Appendix A (of briefing note)

Responsibilities	contingency planning)	CoLP Commander Ops	City Communications	City Police Communications	M&CP	DBE	CoLP FCR	Partnerships	R&C	IT	City Procurement
Corporate ownership	A	A	R	R	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
Super user (admin of admins) (Level 1)	I	I	I	C	C	C	C			R	
Admin user (Level 2)			R	R	R	R	R	R	R		
Critical Messaging to all (subscribers to CoLP only)	I	I	A	A			R	R			
CoLC Messaging to own staff	I		I		R	R			R		
Incident Management	I	I	I	I			R	I	I		

Premium Audio Bulletin Board	A		I	I					R		
Account Management (Current Supplier)	C	C	I	C	C	C	I	I	C	R	C
Contractual replacement (start June 2018)	A	A	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	R
Quality assurance messaging	I	I	I	R							
Change control (configuration)	I	I	I	I	C	C	C	C	C		
Change control (CoLP messages)		I		C			R	R			
Updating/amending City Police web page Online services and alerts	I	I	I	A/R			I	I			
Change control (CoLC messages)	I		I		R	R			R		

Responsible	R
Accountable	A
Consulted	C
Informed	I

Appendix H

Briefing Note OSC026/SC018

CRM Programme risk to JCCR and Safer Communities Projects

Purpose

- 5) The purpose of this document is to escalate a problem that is known to the Corporation which presents a critical risk to CoLC and to the successful completion of the JCCR project.

Link to JCCR project risks

- 4) OSC/JCCR/R/034 – CRM software cannot be accessed from Police networks and therefore there is a risk that it is not accessible from Bishopsgate the intended location of the JCCR.

Background

The JCCR project has identified a number of critical issues around CRM which could impact on the ability of the JCCR to carry out Corporation functions when it becomes a joint service.

Problem Statement

- 12) The CRM system cannot be accessed from the Police network. This means that a number of services delivered from the Contact Centre, will not be able to be delivered when it moves to Bishopsgate.
- 13) The CRM system is end of life, not fit for purpose and has no obvious replacement. There has been a pilot of Salesforce within Economic Development.
- 14) The JCCR is dependent on a fully functioning CRM, without it there is no case management, management reporting, performance data etc. A number of City services are only delivered via CRM. A number of service departments also use CRM, so not having a CRM will remove their line of business application.
- 15) The Safer Communities project has a number of dependencies on a CRM system. Without a functional CRM a number of outcomes from Safer Communities cannot be achieved. These are:
 - a. Cautionary Contacts: A CRM can be used to record individuals who may pose a risk to City staff. A number of CRM systems have this built in to comply with the DPA.
 - b. Joining up information about an individual for the purposes of identifying vulnerability, anti-social behaviour and also to look at recording things like Community Protection Notices and Orders in one place to prevent duplication.

- c. The ability to identify vulnerable people in a secure way in the event of an emergency so that emergency responders can deal appropriately with the issue.

16) CRM has been looked at a number of times by a number of initiatives, but it is unclear if there is a solution, particularly one which will deliver within the timescales of the JCCR and Safer Communities projects.

17) The JCCR and Safer Communities projects are not resourced to deliver a replacement CRM solution. However neither can they deliver the maximum value without a fit for purpose CRM.

18) Many JCCR services should form part of a channel migration strategy to ensure services are delivered digitally as soon as possible. Examples are anything requiring payment which should be moved to an online payment portal.

Options

- 1) Accept the risk of the current CRM becoming end of life; work with CoLP IT to remove the issue of not being able to access the current CRM from a Police network. This will not meet the wider needs of JCCR or Safer Communities but removes the immediate risk of not having access to a system.
- 2) Add to the JCCR project a tactical solution to have a JCCR specific CRM, purchase a cost effective solution via a G-Cloud/Digital Marketplace which is as much OTS as possible with minimum customisation. This will not deliver on wider efficiencies across the Corporation, but will cover off both issues for the JCCR. It may deliver on some of the dependencies of the Safer Communities project.
- 3) Generate a new project to deliver a CRM solution which could either be JCCR specific or fit in with the overall needs of the Corporation. This could sit outside One Safe City, but would need to accommodate the dependencies of the JCCR and Safer Communities projects.

Briefing Note Recommendations / Recommended Next Steps

Recommendation	Action Owner	Date required by	Distribution
Option 2 which is in line with the decision from Summit group about purchasing point solutions for each service's need.	Chris Butler	3 Feb 2017	OSC Board, JCCR Board, SC Board

Programme Board Decision

To be determined

Approval

Name	Date	Organisation	Position
Peter Lisle	30/01/2017	CoLC	Programme SRO
Chris Butler		CoLC	One Safe City Programme Manager

Document history

Version	Date	Changed By	Summary of Changes
0.1	24/01/2017	Gary Griffin / David Calver	Draft document created.
0.2	27/01/2017	Gary Griffin	Recommendation amended in light of paper from summit.
1.0	30/01/2017	Gary Griffin	Final version for OSC Programme SRO

Appendix I

Opportunity Outline



Opportunity
Outline Community



sub project one
pager - community s

Appendix J

Community Safety – Recommendations Matrix



Copy of
CommunitySafetyPr

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Consultation and assurance check list

Directorate / Dept.	Name	Supported/ Not Supported Summary of comments & Feedback	Date
SRO, One Safe City, Assistant Town Clerk	Peter Lisley		
Safer Communities, Project Executive	Steve Presland		
Town Clerks	Alex Orme		
Town Clerks	Glen Marshall		
Community Safety	David Mackintosh		
Community Safety	Valeria Cadena- Wrigley		
Port Health and Public Protection Director	Jon Aaverns		
Assistant Director Public Protection	Steve Blake		
Head of Police Change Portfolio Office	Pauline Weaver		
Safer Communities, Project Manager	Gary Griffin		
Safer Communities, Business Analyst	Michael Cocksedge		